

T O P S E C R E T



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

December 29, 1961

BY LIAISON

FBI REVIEW
COMPLETED.

Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. McCone:

Material contained in the enclosed memorandum was supplied by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past. This material relates to comments made by Luis Carlos Prestes, General Secretary, Communist Party of Brazil, while in Moscow, Russia, in November, 1961. These remarks pertain to the political and economic conditions in Brazil today.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, this communication and its enclosure are classified "Top Secret." This information is also being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

CIA 75 #173112

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 29, 1961

BRAZIL TODAY -
AS SEEN BY ITS TOP COMMUNIST

In November, 1961, Luis Carlos Prestes, General Secretary, Communist Party of Brazil, conferred in Moscow, Russia, with Tim Buck, Chairman of the Communist Party of Canada, and a representative of the Communist Party, USA, all three having been delegates to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was held in Moscow in October, 1961. This conference was arranged to enable Prestes to brief the other two delegates in regard to the current political and economic conditions in Brazil as they relate to the Communist Party of Brazil. There follows a summary of the high lights of Prestes' remarks.

Prestes stated that after the resignation of Brazilian President Janio Quadros, many complex events took place which were not easily understood outside Brazil. He pointed out that the reactionary forces supported Quadros at the last election and that the Communist Party and the progressives supported Joao Goulart and Henrique Lott. Subsequently, Lott criticized Cuba and the Soviet Union, as a result of which he was in turn criticized by the Communist Party of Brazil. This helped to defeat Lott. The election campaign was very significant since it enabled the Communist Party to reach the people.

Although the Communist Party of Brazil opposed many of the policies of Quadros, it did support him on his more "progressive policies." The Party there congratulated Quadros when he supported Cuba and when he requested that the Soviet Union be recognized by Brazil. Quadros would have

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had the support of the masses and the Communist Party if he had taken steps against the military. However, at the time he resigned he turned over power to the military to establish a fascist-like dictatorship. Outside of Brazil, Quadros was presented as a "progressive" but this was not a true characterization.

The generals in the army consider Goulart a "communist." Although Goulart is President of the Labor Party and is a rich man, he nevertheless has influence among the workers. At the time Goulart took over power in Brazil the country was on the verge of civil war and the military stated that he would not be permitted to take office as President of Brazil. The crisis in Brazil has demonstrated that there are contradictions so profound there that some change must take place which will put the workers and peasants in a different position. To date the executive power exercised by the President of Brazil and his cabinet must be endorsed by the Parliament of Brazil, which is in the hands of the "reactionaries."

The Communist Party of Brazil is currently exploiting all of that country's problems and the Party today is strong as a result of these struggles. Although the Party does not exist formally in Brazil, it does have offices in all cities and the Party has demonstrated its fighting capabilities. Its membership totals 30,000 and a campaign is presently under way to double this figure by March, 1962.

Forthcoming events of interest are a meeting of the various Latin-American communist parties in Brazil in March, 1962; the Fourth National Congress of Trade Unionists to be held in Brazil sometime in 1962; and a "progressive" Lawyers Congress to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in January, 1962.

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VIA LIAISON

3 JAN 1962

✓ *paid*
Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I very much appreciate your two letters of 20 December
and your two letters of 21 December transmitting the
Top Secret reports from your highly sensitive source.

I have read these reports with a great deal of interest
and have also made them available to a very few of our
senior officials here on a strict need-to-know basis.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John A. McCone
Director

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T O P S E C R E T



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 20, 1961

BY LIAISON

Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. McCone:

Material contained in the enclosed memorandum was supplied by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past. Information in this memorandum relates to the extemporaneous remarks of Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), at the final banquet, November 5, 1961, for the fraternal delegates from foreign communist parties who had attended the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication and its enclosure "Top Secret." This information is being furnished to other appropriate officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Edgar Hoover", is written below the typed name.

Enclosure

T O P S E C R E T

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 20, 1961

THE GHOSTS OF STALIN AND BERIA

On November 5, 1961, the final official banquet was given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the fraternal delegates from the various foreign communist parties who had attended the 22nd Congress of the CPSU held in Moscow, Russia, during October, 1961. This banquet was held in the Palace of Congress, the Kremlin, Moscow, in the banquet facilities maintained on the top floor. Representing the Soviet Union at this banquet were individuals from the top leadership of the CPSU, the Government and the military service.

Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, CPSU, made the opening toast in which he wished well to all delegates and their parties. Subsequently, he arose and rendered a second toast. His comments were extemporaneous, the essence of which, as related by our source, is as follows:

"Stalin had never been a man of the people. He had never gone out among people to see how they lived. Party leaders and officials were afraid to meet with him. Some even said that Stalin would look at a person and say he didn't like this guy and that person, thereafter, never knew whether this remark would cause him to be imprisoned, exiled or killed.

"Stalin decapitated the leadership of the CPSU and even in the early 1930's some people were already becoming leery of him. Suspicion began to arise when it was said that collectivization had been completed and we were now on the road to socialism. To these statements, Stalin answered that during the stage of the building of socialism the class struggle even now becomes sharper. They could not believe this, but they went along.

"During the reign of Stalin, people were afraid to even talk among themselves concerning the disappearance of the Party leadership and its cadre.

"During the war, frequently orders came down from Stalin without him ever knowing what was going on. On one occasion, during the war, I had just returned from the front

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and had been without rest for many hours. Stalin called and insisted that I come immediately to talk to him although it was perhaps three o'clock in the morning. I came to see Stalin and the conversation we had exposed Stalin's ignorance of the feeling of the soldier at the front.

"In regard to Stalin's personal behavior, it was not good. He molested his wife and some of his relatives. Today, we are still studying the documents of the misdeeds of Stalin, his murders and kidnappings and the gang around him.

"I must tell one story and, of course, it is not for publication. First of all, we had just gone through a horrible war. You would have thought Stalin would have busied himself with reconstruction, housing and the like. Instead, he was busy preparing a thesis on linguistics and a textbook on economics, which we had to listen to at the Nineteenth Congress. His book contained the kind of economics which would have forever kept us in poverty.

"During the postwar period, there came a request from the Ukraine for tractors so the people could grow more crops and produce more food. In response to their request, he told them to use horses instead of tractors to grow grain. He did not have the slightest idea about the suffering of our people at this time.

"Some of us began to think and talk but we were afraid. Finally, God took mercy on us and Stalin died. Stalin had a heart seizure or stroke. At the time, I was in charge of the Moscow City Committee but no one consulted me. Finally, I and some others were called and informed that he had had this stroke. We all went to his dacha, his summer place. When we arrived, we found Georgi M. Malenkov and Nikolai A. Bulganin, as well as a group of doctors, were already present. There lay Stalin, nobody doing anything. The doctors were afraid to touch him in fear of being subjected to his wrath. It was only after paralysis had set in, when Stalin could talk no more, that the doctors moved in. Some hours later the doctors called back and said that Stalin is dead.

"At the time we were aware the chief influence around Stalin had been Lavrenti Beria who had surrounded himself with his own people and did just as he pleased. He could dispose of people as he saw fit and did so frequently without the nod of Stalin.

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"Before Stalin had died, he had already talked to Malenkov, Kliment E. Voroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich concerning a successor. Someone was also to talk to Vyacheslav M. Molotov on this same matter. They spoke of Beria as a Stalin successor, but I said Beria, in the leadership, will never let you have power again.

"Malenkov was a weakling and we were not sure he wouldn't make an alliance behind our back. Molotov had no imagination and was playing for an alliance with Beria.

"These were terrible days, for we knew Beria was planning to take power. He was planning to exile, arrest or retire all in the leadership of the Party.

"Beria, we know now, was a working German agent. We have documents and facts to prove this. He was prepared to bring about a betrayal of the country.

"Beria concocted a plan to build palaces in the Caucasus Mountains for the Party leadership. I came to see him once when he unveiled his plan to build these palaces and asked me to look them over. When he showed me these plans, I got the idea of the scheme; it was to build a prison for the present leadership. I played along with him. I went to Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin and some of the others and told them we had to do something. This is when Malenkov became the leader.

"Later, evidence came to our attention that Beria was actually beginning to dispose of some people and was building his own machine around him. How did this happen? Well, there was a Party secretary by the name of Kominsky in Baku. This secretary had gone through the Civil War, was sentenced to death by the British but had escaped. After Stalin died, we found in the archives information that Kominsky was supposed to have been a British agent after the war and that he had been shot. However, we know that Kominsky had discovered some of Beria's machinations and frame-ups.

"Then I discovered something else. I had two kind, humane Jewish comrades who worked for me; one by the name of Rabinovitz. Neither of these individuals would have killed a fly. One day they disappeared. I inquired and was told that it had been found out that they were planning to assassinate Stalin and were killed. Later, I found out that they had been assassinated by Beria.

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"All of these things made me think. The longer we wait, the more dangerous this man Beria becomes. I talked to Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Malenkov on this matter. Finally, we got wind of the fact that Beria was planning to take over. We now agreed we had to get Beria, that the question was how were we to get to him to arrest him, particularly with all his bodyguards. We finally worked out a scheme.

"I went to see my war buddy, General Mascalenko, and one or two of my other trusted friends. I asked Mascalenko if he had enough brave officers who would be willing to die for the fatherland. He advised me that he had and that he could neutralize the rest of Beria's apparatus.

"The plan we decided upon was to hold a Presidium meeting in the Kremlin and inform Beria that the others wanted to hear about his plans for retirement palaces. This would not alert him mentally to the fact that anything was amiss. We figured out among ourselves where he would sit. We felt he had a gun in his briefcase and that we had to get this gun out of his reach. I told the other members of the Presidium that this plan had to work. At the selected time, Mascalenko and his trusted friends came in. They had hidden their weapons in order to get past the security guards in the Kremlin. They informed us that they had stationed enough of their people in the Kremlin to handle any situation that might arise.

"At this point, we realized that General Zhukov, an alternate member of the Presidium, was present at this meeting and he outranked Mascalenko. In order not to antagonize Zhukov, five minutes before the plan was to be finalized, we told him of it and gave him the task of reading the order of arrest. Under Stalin's rule, members of the Presidium could not carry arms but I had sneaked in a gun at this meeting.

"At the scheduled time, the Presidium meeting started with Beria present. At the selected time, the officers marched in and Zhukov read the arrest order. Beria made a reach for his briefcase, but I pushed it away. Later, we found it contained a gun as we suspected.

"Mascalenko, who at the time was in charge of the air defenses of Moscow, took Beria to a place he had worked out in advance. This was to an underground bunker under the direct control of Mascalenko. While there, Beria cried and whined.

"At the trial the most horrible things came out. It was found that Beria had engaged in all kinds of lawless activities. The man had a harem. He used to take a liking

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to a woman even if she was the wife of one of his own bodyguards. If she would not submit, he would jail her. He once had a captain of his bodyguards who lived in a place close to his residence. The bodyguard had a little girl under 15 years of age, and Beria got a liking to her and insisted she be brought to him. The parents pleaded for her. He raped her. The little girl went insane, the mother went insane and he killed his captain of the guards. At the trial, in a whining way, Beria said, 'All right, I will marry the girl.'

"Here was the man who almost inherited the mantle of Stalin and had come within a hairbreadth of taking over the leadership of our Party. These were the people who ruled by the cult of personality.

"The reason I have gone into this is to show the tyranny of the cult of the personality. Leadership without restraint is bound to lead to the rule of the cult of the personality. Leadership should be respected and the leadership must have the authority derived from law. We must watch the concept of socialist legality. Legality must be protected so there can be no repetition of the cult of the personality."

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SOURCE	FBI	CIA CONTROL NO.	173103
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED	22 Dec 61
DOC. DATE	20 Dec 61	LOGGED BY	emg/er
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

T O P S E C R E T



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 20, 1961

BY LIAISON

Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Administration Building
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. McCone:

Material contained in the enclosed memorandum was supplied by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past. Information in this memorandum relates to the remarks of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev at a small banquet held in the Kremlin on October 30, 1961, for the English-speaking fraternal delegates to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which took place in Moscow, Russia, in October, 1961. These remarks concern the stalemate in Berlin, Germany, between the United States and the Soviet Union and Russia's justification for resumption of nuclear testing.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication and its enclosure "Top Secret." This information is being furnished to other appropriate officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
December 20, 1961

WITHIN THE KREMLIN WALLS

On October 30, 1961, a private banquet was given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in honor of English-speaking fraternal delegates to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Approximately 50 people attended this banquet, which was held in the Palace of Congress, the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the head of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), delegation, occupied a position of prominence at one side of Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU, while another American delegate, Henry Winston, sat at Khrushchev's other side. Flynn is Chairman and Winston is a Vice-Chairman of the CPUSA.

Since the affair was intimate and small, Khrushchev spoke to the group informally and without notes. The essence of his remarks, as related by our source, is as follows:

"I give my greetings to all the fraternal delegates present who are here for the purpose of attending the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

"I have in my hand a report that American tanks have been drawn up to the border in Berlin and have moved into position. Let them move in their tanks, for a half a mile away we have ten times as many tanks and better ones. The United States can play its military games, which could lead to provocations, and then, when they are ready, we are prepared to negotiate. We will have patience and seriously try to reach some understanding through negotiation on this Berlin problem with the Western Powers. However, there must be a solution and treaties have to be signed with both East Germany and West Germany, for it has been 16 years since the war ended and that is a long time. But, for one thing, you can be certain the Soviet Union is not going to act as a traffic policeman for the United States or any other Allied Power in Germany.

"Intelligence at our disposal not only indicates that the United States is arming Germany, but that all of NATO is arming in preparation for an assault on the Soviet Union. They might be tempted into this adventure unless

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they can be convinced that a retaliatory blow could finish them off. We are not looking for war; nevertheless, we will not be pushed around or be caught unprepared as in 1941.

"Today, the Soviet Union is like an elephant, and there is no question but that United States capitalism is a real tiger, not a paper one. However, if the elephant is strong, the tiger will avoid it, unless it is berserk.

"I want to talk on the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. For over two years we participated in talks at Geneva on the subject of atomic controls and without success. At the same time, we unilaterally stopped the testing of our own devices. In the meanwhile, the French were carrying on atomic tests and conniving with the Americans and the British to test some of their devices.

"We realized that the West was misconstruing the concept of peaceful coexistence and since we had found that diplomacy could not solve our problems alone, we had to show these people that we were prepared, so we decided to resume nuclear testing and have done so. I must admit that one nuclear device which we exploded was larger than the 50-megaton one we had anticipated; in fact, it was much closer to 60 megatons."

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DATE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

7 Jul 62

9. APR 1962

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ER 62-958/a

VIA LIAISON

5 MAR 1962

✓
cancel
Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

It was indeed thoughtful of you to send me the
information concerning [redacted].

I very much appreciate your bringing this to my
personal attention.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. MCCONE

John A. McCone
Director

O/DCI/[redacted]rap(15 Feb 62)

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Mr. McCone:

I have discussed the attached with Sam Papich who says the Bureau is unable to think of any action which they might take against ☐ on two grounds:

1. There appears to be no legal question involved;
2. Even if the information is valid, this sort of information is not this source's primary business and they do not wish to jeopardize this source who is extremely sensitive and provides very good reports on other subjects.

The Bureau has been asked to look through their files for anything else of this nature and to bring any further reports of this type to our immediate attention.

Recommend letter be dispatched as it stands.

WE

22 February

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